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HARMONIZING PREFERENTIAL RULES OF ORIGIN IN THE LIGHT
OF WTO DISCIPLINES
John J. Barceló III
W.N. Cromwell Professor of Law
Cornell University School of Law

INTRODUCTION
Preferential arrangements (bilateral and multilateral free trade areas and
GSP systems (preferences for developing countries)) are emerging everywhere
in the world trading system and are causing concern because they discriminate
against non-members and add complexity, distortions and inconsistency to the
global system. Rules of origin (ROOs) linked to these arrangments are a
significant part of the problem. More and more they have become the source in
their own right of distortions in trade patterns, complexity, non-transparency and
inconsistency. This essay argues that WTO members should authorize
negotiations seeking to harmonize preferential ROOs (rules of origin linked to
preferential arrangements) around core principles consistent with WTO rules.
The harmonized preferential ROOs should be aligned as much as possible with
the harmonized regime for non-preferential ROOs (rules of origin linked to nonpreferential arrangements) likely to emerge from the current hold-over WTO
negotiations authorized by the Uruguay Round ROOs Agreement. They should
be nonrestrictive, based essentially on the principle that substantial
transformation confers origin, and--except where developing countries benefit-should not allow cumulation (treating product components from within the
preferential region as locally produced). This introduction first discusses some
fundamentals about ROOs and then explains the structure of the essay.
2

Importing countries use ROOs to determine the national origin of imports.
Normally substantial processing must occur in the shipment country before a
good would be considered to originate there. Sometimes even more than
“substantial processing” is mandated. ROOs are the provisions that determine
for each product what exactly is required.

ROOs are divided into two fundamental types: preferential and nonpreferential, depending on the nature of the policy instrument to which they are
linked.1 Preferential ROOs (PROOs) are linked to trade policy instruments,
such Free Trade Area (FTA) agreements or Generalized System of Preference
(GSP) systems, that accord preferential market access (reduced or zero tariff
rates) to imports from select countries (FTA members or developing country
beneficiaries of a GSP system). Preferential ROOs determine whether a good
has the national origin of a preference country, in which case it gets preferential
market access.

Non-preferential ROOs (NPROOs) are linked to policy instruments of a
more general nature that do not involve preferential access for goods—for
example, a customs regime requiring all imports to bear a mark of origin. These
policy instruments involve both neutral and also more politically sensitive
purposes, though none involves offering preferential market access. Falling at
the neutral--or non-political--end of the spectrum, for example, are programs for
collecting trade statistics (bilateral trade balances) and, as stated, for imposing
marks of origin on imports. At the politically sensitive end, there are policy
instruments for restricting trade from select countries. This category includes
such provisions as basic tariff laws (applicability of MFN or non-MFN tariffs),

1

Strictly speaking, it is the underlying policy instrument, and not the rules of origin themselves, that accords a
preference or that is non-preferential in nature. For convenience, however, the rules of origin associated with
these preferential or non-preferential policy instruments have come to be called preferential or non-preferential
ROOs, respectively.
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selective quotas, selective safeguard measures, antidumping duties,
countervailing duties, and government procurement restrictions. Except for
statistical and consumer information programs, NPROOs generally decide
whether a good will face restricted entry (as opposed to preferential entry)
because it comes from a country against which restrictions apply.

In today’s world most traded goods contain components from, or are
subject to processes in, more than one country. Some goods, however, plainly
originate wholly in one country. Examples include animals raised in a single
country, non-processed agricultural goods grown and harvested in a single
country, and minerals extracted in a single country. For such products ROOs
are uniform and non-controversial; they accord origin to that single country. In
discussing ROOs this essay excludes such straightforward ROOs applicable to
single-country goods and will always refer only to those ROOs applying to
goods produced with the use of multiple inputs from, or processes in, two or
more countries.

Support for harmonizing ROOs stems from the desire for transparency,
simplicity, and reduction of transactions costs in global trade. This essay
focuses primarily on harmonizing PROOs. Nevertheless, some understanding of
efforts to harmonize NPROOs is essential for a discussion of PROOs, in part
because the world trading system is much further along in efforts to harmonize
NPROOs and has not yet even seriously considered an undertaking to harmonize
PROOs.

This essay contains four major parts. The first part, immediately below,
discusses the current state of efforts to harmonize NPROOs. The second part
turns to PROOs and discusses the trade distorting effects of preferential regimes,
with a particular emphasis on trade distortions attributable to the PROOs
4

themselves and not just to the underlying policy instruments to which they are
linked. This discussion is important for understanding the issues that arise when
one asks (as Part three does) whether certain provisions of exisiting PROOs
should be avoided in harmonized rules because those provisions transgress basic
WTO principles and rules. Part three, then, turns to a discussion of the relevant
WTO rules that may apply to constrain or discipline PROOs. Part four discusses
the current EU effort to harmonize ROOs in preferential arrangements to which
the EU is a party. This is the best-known example of a serious effort to
harmonize PROOs—albeit at only the regional level. The conclusion urges a
harmonization effort for PROOs at the WTO level and restates the core
principles around which such an effort should be structured. The goal should be
clear, relatively easy to apply rules, of a non-restrictive nature, based as much as
possible on the emerging harmonized NPROOs and on the fundamental notion
that substantial transformation confers origin. The cumulation rule should also
be eliminated, unless it benefits a developing country.

NON-PREFERENTIAL ROOs

Prior to the Uruguay Round, the only significant multilateral effort to
harmonize ROOs was promoted by the Customs Cooperation Council (CCC) in
Brussels2 and led to the inclusion of certain provisions in the 1974 Kyoto
Convention.3 Those provisions did not distinguish between preferential and
non-preferential ROOs and were not binding in any event. They merely set
down preferred guidelines for ROOs. For goods processed in more than one
country the Kyoto Convention endorses the “last significant transformation”
concept as the main origin determining principle. For further precision the
2

Bernard Hoekman, “Rules of Origin for Goods and Services,” 27 Journal World Trade Law 81, 84 (Issue 4,
1993).
3

International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures, Annex D.1.A, 18
May 1973, S. Treaty Doc. No. 23, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
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convention lists other alternatives that a country could employ to help determine
whether the “significant transformation” threshold had been crossed: i) change
in tariff heading (origin is conferred where various components are processed to
produce a final product that falls under a different Harmonized System tariff
heading from the heading applicable to each of the components); ii) specific
processing operations; and iii) value added requirements.4 These are the
primary origin-determining mechanisms most countries currently use.

Uruguay Round ROOs Agreement and Harmonization
Because the GATT contains almost nothing on ROOs,5 the Uruguay
Round ROOs Agreement, which entered into force along with the other WTO
agreements on January 1, 1995, is the main WTO instrument dealing directly
with ROOs. The agreement’s purpose is to achieve a harmonized set of ROOs,
but it deals essentially only with NPROOs. A Common Understanding
applicable to PROOs was added as Annex II of the agreement, but it is of
limited significance. It deals essentially with transparency goals, not
harmonization, and includes such requirements as notifying the WTO of all
PROOs, providing clear definitions, responding promptly to trader inquiries, and
ensuring due process is followed in determinations and review procedures. The
agreement’s separate and minimalist treatment of PROOs presumably reflects
the greater political sensitivity that surrounds these provisions.

The main goals of the ROOs Agreement are: first, to create a
multilaterally agreed set of harmonized NPROOs for all products in the
Harmonized System nomenclature, which ROOs would then be used for all

4

Hoekman ’93 supra at 84.

5

GATT Article IX provides for MFN treatment on marks of origin, which would apply anyway, and not much
else concerning ROOs.
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NPROOs purposes; 6 second, to set forth the main principles that will govern
application of the harmonized NPROOs once they are adopted and enter into
force;7 and third, to establish the main principles that will govern application of
NPROOs during the transition period, which applies until the harmonization
work is completed (presumably meaning until the harmonized rules enter into
force).8

Although the deadlines set out in the ROOs Agreement for the
harmonization project have not been met, the harmonization work program has
made substantial progress and seems near completion, though the results have
not yet been made public.9 Article 9(1) sets out the fundamental principle that
has guided this work. A good is to have the origin of the country in which the
“last substantial transformation” occurs—the core principle of the 1974 Kyoto
Convention. This has the practical significance that customs officials in the
importing country generally need only consider the production processes
occurring in the country of immediate export, if the transformation there is
sufficient.

Article 9(2) deals with how to make the “last substantial transformation”
test operational. First, the Technical Committee is to define certain minimal
processes that by themselves would not be sufficient to bring about substantial
6

ROOs Agreement Art. 9

7

ROOs Agreement Art. 3

8

ROOs Agreement Art. 2.

9
Some observers are pessimistic about the prospects for a successful outcome of the ongoing negotiations. See
Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 2006 at 279 (on line at
http://www.adb.org/Documents/books/ado/2006/documents/ado2006-part3.pdf.) (“At a multilateral level, the
‘harmonization’ program in nonpreferential rules of origin at WTO has dragged on for more than 10 years and is
still not close to being realized.”) A major obstacle to final agreement is the issue of scope of coverage of the
harmonized ROOs. Although the ROOs Agreement itself provides in Article 1(2) for very broad coverage,
disagreement seems to exist over whether anti-circumvention measures applicable to anti-dumping and
countervailing-duty orders in some countries, namely the United States and the EU, should be included in the
coverage of the harmonized ROOs. Exclusion of the anti-circumvention regimes might be the best option,
especially if this would produce a less restrictive set of harmonized NPROOs.
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transformation. Second, and more important, the Technical Committee is to
define for each product in the HS nomenclature, what constitutes “substantial
transformation”. How is this to be done? Article 9(2) explains.

Change in Tariff Heading (CTH)

Article 9(2) uses, as its fundamental approach, change in tariff
classification where intermediate products are combined or processed to make a
final product. Supplemental tests for exceptional cases augment this basic
approach where processing that would meet the change-in-tariff-classification
test would nevertheless not involve a substantial transformation. The goal for the
generally applicable change-in-tariff-classification approach is to choose the
smallest tariff classification change that is consistent in most cases with the
“substantial transformation” principle.10 Opting for the smallest tariff
classification change as the generally applicable rule means that the test is
sometimes overinclusive (including production processes that achieve the
required tariff classification change without truly involving a “substantial
transformation”). The supplemental tests are employed to deal with these
exceptional cases.

The HS nomenclature is divided into 21 sections (the most general
category); 96 chapters (captured by the first two digits of the harmonized tariff
code); a large number of “headings” under each chapter (captured by the next
two digits—sometimes referred to as the four digit level); a still larger number
10

ROOs agreement Article 9(2)(c)(ii) provides: “The Technical Committee shall consider * * *, on the basis of
the criterion of substantial transformation, the use of change of tariff subheading or heading when developing
rules of origin for particular products or a product sector and, if appropriate, the minimum change within the
nomenclature that meets this criterion.” (emphasis added) The “if appropriate” qualifier is not explained.
Perhaps it means that a minimum change need not be used if a substantial transformation would not occur in a
large number of cases in which the change of tariff classification requirement had been met. That a change at the
subheading level (the six digit level) is listed before a change at the heading level (the four digit level) seems
further to state a preference for the smallest tariff classification change that would satisfy “substantial
transformation.”
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of “sub-headings” under each “heading” (captured by the next two digits—
sometimes called the six digit level); and still more detailed levels of
differentiation beyond—sometimes called the “statistical level”. Allowing a
tariff classification change at the eight digit level to suffice would generally
mean an easily-satisfied or liberal test; whereas requiring a change at the
chapter—or two digit level—would generally be more restrictive, requiring
more processing.

One of the major advantages of the change-in-tariff-heading (CTH)
method is its relative ease of administration for customs officials and its
inexpensiveness and predictability for private firms11--at least as compared to
the alternative methods (specific processing--which must deal with constant
technological innovation--and value adde--which must confront auditing
expense, uncertainty, delays, and price and exchange rate changes). The dark
side of the change-in-tariff-heading method is its technical complexity and the
opportunity this affords special interests to capture the definitional process.
David Palmeter has pointed out that generalists cannot truly understand the
rationale behind particular requirements of shifts in tariff headings, subheadings
and statistical headings.12 Only specialists in the relevant business sector, who
work day in and out with the subcomponents, components, and end products and
the processes involved in putting them together, will truly understand the
meaning and significance of the terms and descriptions in the headings and
subheadings. The specialist, then, can take advantage of the complexity and nontransparency to advance special interest causes without it being clear to nonspecialists who gains and who loses.
11
David Palmeter points out that the CTH method, though perhaps on balance the least costly and clearest, is
nevertheless not without costs (e.g., maintaining records of input origins and classifications), classification
conundrums, and other disadvantages. See David Palmeter, The WTO as a Legal System—Essays on
International Trade Law and Policy 141; 150-152 (2003)
12

David Palmeter, The WTO as a Legal System—Essays on International Trade Law and Policy 151 and 159
(2003)
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Several features of this harmonization effort forecast that a relatively
“neutral” and non-restrictive set of harmonized ROOs is likely to emerge. As
noted, the “last substantial transformation” concept is the guiding principle, and
the “minimum change within the nomenclature that meets this criterion”13 is to
be chosen. Thus a country will not be authorized to use, for example, the “most
significant transformation” test, which can more easily be manipulated to assign
a product an origin that will trigger a quota or selective safeguard restriction.
The agreement also provides forthrightly that ROOs: “*** should not be used
as instruments to pursue trade objectives directly or indirectly. They should not
themselves create restrictive, distorting or disruptive effects on international
trade.”14

Once the harmonized NPROOs are agreed upon, they are to be added as
an annex to the ROOs Agreement. A Ministerial Conference is then to decide
the time-frame for their entry into force.15 If this is achieved, it will add greater
rationality, transparency, and efficiency to trade transactions. It will also
provide an important multilateral standard representing an agreed-upon set of
neutral, non-restrictive ROOs identifying essentially when a product can
legitimately be said to have experienced a substantial transformation for origin
purposes. Such a standard could play an important role in subsequent efforts to
harmonize PROOs and--in the absence of such harmonization--in employing
WTO rules to discipline their use. We turn now to this essay’s main topic:
preferential ROOs.

13

ROO Agreement Article 9(2)(c)(ii).

14

ROO Agreement Article 9(1)(d).

15

ROO Agreement Article 9(4).
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PREFERENTIAL ROOs

The two main forms of preferential arrangements for which ROOs apply
are first, those resulting from regional and bilateral free trade agreements
(FTAs) and second, those involving unilateral (non-reciprocal) preferential
access granted by industrial countries to certain goods coming from developing
countries under a Generalized System of Preference (GSP) regime. Both
arrangements violate the core non-discrimination principle of the WTO. FTAs
are nevertheless authorized under the conditions set out in GATT Article XXIV.
GSP systems are authorized by the “Enabling Clause” adopted in a 1979 GATT
Decision.16

Preferential arrangements are widespread in the world trading system. By
one estimate approximately 300 bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements
and customs unions will be in effect by 2007.17 Almost all countries belong to
one or more preferential arrangements. A large percentage of total world trade
is now subject to at least one of these arrangements or to a GSP system. For
example, the EU now applies its MFN tariff to only nine trading partners.18 A
quick glance at World Bank charts showing the multiple overlapping
memberships and hub and spoke features of these arrangements explains the
origin of the “spaghetti bowl” epithet for these systems.19 The lines sketching
the membership links in these agreements resemble the criss-crossing
16

See GATT, 26th Supp. Basic Instruments & Selected Documents (BISD) 203 (1980).

17

Peter Sutherland, Jagdish Bhagwati, Kwesi Botchwey, Niall Fitzgerald, Koichi Hamada, John H. Jackson,
Celso Lafer, & Thierry de Montbrial, The Future of the WTO at 22 (WTO, Switzerland, 2004). See also, The
World Bank, Global Economic Prospects—Trade, Regionalism, and Development 2005 (The World Bank:
Washington, D.C. 2005) (Chapter 2: Regional Trade and Preferential Trading Arrangements: A Global
Perspective). According to the Asian Development Bank some estimates predict 300 bilateral agreements alone
by the end of 2006. Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 2006 at 276 (on line at
http://www.adb.org/Documents/books/ado/2006/documents/ado2006-part3.pdf.)
18

These include: Australia; Canada; Chinese Taipei; Hong Kong; China; Japan; Korea; New Zealand;
Singapore; and the US. The Future of the WTO, supra at 21 and fn 11.
19

The World Bank 2005 supra at 39.
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entanglements of spaghetti strings in a bowl. The large number of these
systems and the variety, inconsistency, and complexity of their ROOs add
substantial compliance costs for traders serving multiple markets and for
customs officials in those markets.

For those who see value in these arrangements, excessive compliance
costs are undesirable, and harmonization of ROOs could be an attractive
remedy. When multiple ROOs vary or conflict, producers and traders cannot be
sure that a single production run, with a certain make-up of components and
value added, will satisfy all relevant ROOs. If more than one production run is
needed to satisfy different sets of ROOs, returns to scale are lost.

Of course if one opposes these discriminatory regimes in the first place,
increased compliance costs might be welcomed as a desirable deterrent to their
use. If the compliance costs are too high, traders will simply forego preferences
and pay the MFN tariff. This is not an infrequent occurrence. Nevertheless,
even for those who would prefer to dismantle discrimination in the world trading
system, a harmonization project for PROOs could be seen as worthwhile.
Preferential arrangements exist, and traders must take them into account in their
business plans. Hence simplification and harmonization of ROOs would still be
a rational end in itself—the purpose being to improve transparency in the trading
system and reduce unavoidable and wasteful compliance costs that to some
extent must be incurred even for a trader to know whether it would pay to take
advantage of a preference.

In the discussion below, this essay will focus primarily on the desirable
content of a harmonized set of PROOs. There is currently no WTO mandate for
such a harmonization program. In 1996 Japan proposed that the Committee on
Rules of Origin undertake such a project for regional integration schemes
12

because of their growing number and the distorting effects on countries outside
the region.20 Although most of the members spoke against this proposal, four
countries supported it (Australia, Hong Kong, Korea, and Pakistan).21 Once
NPROOs have been harmonized, interest in turning to PROOs may increase. In
any event harmonization would improve the workings of the world trading
system and certainly should be pursued as one of the ways of curtailing potential
distortions from the ever larger number of preferential arrangements on the
global scene.

To understand the underlying policy issues at stake, I turn first to a brief
discussion of the main trade distorting features of preferential arrangements, but
primarily of the ROOs linked to them. The ROOs themselves play an
independent role in exacerbating the level of trade distortion involved. An
understanding of the relevant distortions at stake is important, not only for
understanding how harmonized ROOs of a particular content might help to
correct or lessen the relevant distortions, but also for understanding how WTO
provisions, namely in Article XXIV and to some extent in the Enabling Clause,
might offer grounds for disciplining abusive ROOs and perhaps encourage
harmonization centered around curtailing distortions.

Trade Diversion and Preferential ROOs

The wisdom of allowing FTA and GSP derogations from the core nondiscrimination principle (MFN) of the GATT/WTO system is controversial.
The main arguments supporting and challenging these arrangements have been

20

See Committee on Rules of Origin, Minutes on Meeting on 13 September 1996 at para. 8.4 , World Trade
G/RO/M/7 (4 October, 1996).

21

See Committee on Rules of Origin, Minutes on Meeting of 13 September 1996 at paras. 2.9-2.11, World
Trade G/RO/M/7/Corr. 11 (10 October 1996).
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set out very effectively in The Future of the WTO report22 and in the paper by
Barry Desker and Margaret Liang.23 I will not repeat these arguments here in
any detail. I will concentrate instead on trade diversion in intermediate
products, because this is the main way in which ROOs can exaggerate the trade
distorting effects of preferential arrangements.

As is frequently discussed in trade writings, preferential access for a final
good in an FTA or a GSP system will trigger both trade creation and trade
diversion. Trade creation occurs--and is efficiency enhancing--where a leastcost-producer, found within the preferential area, gains increased market access
through the elimination of tariffs. Trade diversion occurs—and is distortive—
where the least-cost producer is found outside the preferential area and is
displaced within the preference area by a less efficient preference-receiving
producer who is freed of the tariffs that the non-member, least-cost producer
must face.

Trade diversion is undesirable (because it is inefficient), but those who
approve of preferences deem trade diversion an acceptable cost because of the
overall benefits deriving from the regime. In the case of FTAs, claimed benefits
come from trade creation and other aspects of market integration and political
cooperation. In the case of GSP systems, they come from trade creation and,
more importantly, from the claimed assistance they offer developing countries in
meeting their development goals.

We have been discussing the positive and negative effects of preferential
arrangements without distinguishing between final and intermediate products.
22

Peter Sutherland, Jagdish Bhagwati, Kwesi Botchwey, Niall Fitzgerald, Koichi Hamada, John H. Jackson,
Celso Lafer, & Thierry de Montbrial, The Future of the WTO Chapter II (WTO, Switzerland, 2004).
23

Barry Desker & Margaret Liang, “Prospects for Disciplining Customs Unions, Free Trade Areas and
Preferential Trade Agreements” (conference paper).
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For our purpose--that of analyzing the potentially distortive role of PROOs
themselves—the distinction is important. Distortions associated with PROOs
relate primarily to trade diversion in intermediate products, not final products,
which the discussion further below will explain.

Paradoxically, ROOs at the extremes of restrictiveness and liberality
would do away almost entirely with trade diversion concerning both final and
intermediate products, but in an anomalous way.24 At the extreme of
restrictiveness (e.g., 100% value added for processed goods), very few
processed goods would qualify,25 because in the modern production process
most products utilize at least some components imported from foreign countries
or processes occurring abroad. Hence, with impossibly restrictive ROOs a
preference regime would be largely ineffective. No (or very little) trade
distortion would occur in processed products, because almost no processed
product would qualify for preferential access—and hence all reputed benefits
(trade creation and the other development or integrative ends) would also be
sacrificed.

At the most liberal end—the complete absence of ROOs--transshipment
through a preference country would be allowed and there would again be little
or no trade diversion. A least-cost producer in a non-preferred country could
gain preferential access merely by transshipping through a preference country.
Economists refer to such transshipment as “trade deflection.” But here again the
purposes of the preference regime would be defeated. Benefits intended for
preference countries would be reaped instead by non-preference countries via
trade deflection. If just one preference country did not produce the good in
24

I am indebted to Aaditya Mattoo at the World Bank for this observation.

25

Non-processed goods that are sourced in a single country, such as minerals, animals raised on a farm or
unprocessed agricultural goods, would of course qualify. For such goods, however, ROOs are irrelevant,
because their origin will be clear under any conceivable set of ROOs. One exception would be fish, where origin
could be attributed either to the nationality of the waters where they are caught or to that of the fishing vessels
that do the catching.
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question, presumably there would be no tariff barriers in that country to prevent
or constrain trade deflection. In any event trade deflection could always occur
through the country with the lowest tariff barrier. The following diagram
illustrates the degree of trade diversion as a function of the restrictiveness of the
applicable ROOs.

Trade
Diversion
80% VA

10% VA
Restrictiveness of ROOs

ROOs somewhere between the extremes of maximum restrictiveness and
maximum liberality are therefore needed to achieve the purposes of preferential
regimes. In that middle range some amount of trade diversion in final products is
inevitable—the existence of the preference assures that this will be so. In the
case of an FTA, the Article XXIV(8)(b) rule requiring that free trade be
achieved with respect to “substantially all trade” seems likely to prevent
bilateral or regional agreements aimed primarily at trade diversion.26 If it were
26

For a general discussion of this point, see James Mathis, Regional Trade Agreements in the
GATT/WTO: Article XXIV and the Internatl Trade Requirement 113-115 (The Hague, 2002).
Mathis cites other scholars who agree that the “substantially all trade” requirement tends to
prevent FTAs aimed essentially at trade diversion, including Robert Hudec, Comment on
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not for that requirement one might expect to see many FTAs spring up limited to
a few carefully selected final products—where the beneficiaries of trade
diversion on both sides of a border would prosper at the expense of more
efficient third-country competitors. Thus, if the “substantially all trade”
discipline is effectively enforced, it will operate to reduce the element of trade
diversion in final products, though some trade diversion will still occur.

In the case of GSP systems, the essential discipline derives from the
requirement that these regimes be designed to assist developing countries. This
will not reduce trade diversion, but at least the inevitable trade diversion will
benefit export-oriented producers in the developing countries. (Of course, those
who dispute the wisdom of trade preferences for developing countries would
challenge the desirability of this outcome for the long-term development goals
of developing countries.27)

Returning to the role of ROOs in preferential regimes, we can see that
another form of trade diversion is closely linked to the restrictiveness level of
ROOs within the general middle range that will apply in practice. The trade
diversion that operates here concerns intermediate, rather than final, products.
ROOs with high restrictiveness within the middle range (e.g., 60% to 80% value
added) will cause a greater degree of trade diversion in intermediate products—
that is, where some form of “component cumulation” is allowed. I use the term
“component cumulation” to mean that intermediate products from within the
cumulation area (e.g., from FTA members) will be counted as local components
Michael Finger, “Gatt’s Influence on Regional Arrangements,” in Jamie De Melo and Arwind
Panagariya (eds.), New Dimensions in Regional Integration 155 (Center for Economic Policy
Research, Cambridge University Press. 1993); Frieder Roessler, “The Relationship Between
Regional Integration Agreements and the Multilateral Trade Order,” in K. Anderson and R.
Blackhurst (eds.), Regional Integration and the Global Trading System at 314 (Harvester
Wheatsheaf, 1993); Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue 51 (Carnegie Endowment, 1950).
27

See, e.g., Robert Hudec, Developing Countries in the GATT Legal System (Gower, 1987)
(especially chapters 9-11).
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for origin purposes. In other words a producer in a beneficiary country will
have an incentive to use more expensive cumulation-region components in a
final product in order to qualify for duty-free access to the preferential market
(for the final product). In some circumstances more expensive intermediate
products from within the cumulation region will displace less expensive
intermediate products from outside the region—resulting in trade diversion in
intermediate products.

For a classic example of this phenomenon consider the NAFTA origin
rule for ketchup.28 The rule is restrictive; it does not allow the process of
converting tomato paste into ketchup (which would seem to be a substantial
transformation) to confer origin. The rule thus appears aimed at ensuring that
U.S. ketchup manufacturers will use Mexican tomato paste (a NAFTA origin
component that counts as an originating input) in their production of ketchup
instead of cheaper tomato paste from Chile (not a NAFTA member). As
preferential ROOs move toward the more restrictive end of the middle range (in
essence requiring higher and higher value added), more and more trade
diversion in intermediate products will occur—again, as long as regional
component cumulation is permitted in the ROOs regime. The discussion below
argues that both regional component cumulation and restrictive ROOs should be
avoided in FTA regimes, including in any harmonization effort for the
applicable ROOs. Indeed, the discussion goes a step further to argue that
generally both regional component cumulation and highly restrictive ROOs are
inconsistent with existing WTO rules.

28

The example comes from David Palmeter, The WTO as a Legal System—Essays on International Trade Law
and Policy at 142-143; 149-151 (Cameron May, London, 2003); David Palmeter, “Rules of Origin in Regional
Trade Agreements,” in Paul Demaret, Jean-Francois Bellis, & Gonzalo Garcia Jimenez, Regionalism and
Multilateralism aftter the Uruguay Round at 343-344 (European Interuniversity Press, Brussels, 1997).
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Cumulation, Restrictive ROOs, and Trade Diversion in Intermediate
Products.

Component cumulation is normally a feature of all FTA

agreements.29 At first blush it seems only logical that intermediate products
from within the region should be counted as helping to confer origin, because
such products do not pose the risk of trade deflection from outside the region—
the very trade pattern that ROOs are designed to prevent. However, it is
component cumulation itself in ROOs regimes that is a major culprit in causing
intermediate-product trade diversion. Once component cumulation is in place,
regional intermediate good producers have every incentive to push for more
restrictive ROOs in the middle range. Restrictive ROOs combined with regional
component cumulation then operate in tandem to cause trade diversion in
intermediate products. I will argue below that both component cumulation and
excessively restrictive ROOs in FTAs should be seen as generally inconsistent
with GATT Article XXIV. If regional component cumulation were eliminated
from FTA agreements, the pressure for more restrictive ROOs coming from
intermediate good producers--at least those not located in the final assembly
country--would be significantly reduced, because such producers would no
longer benefit from restrictive ROOs.

Were the component cumulation rule eliminated in FTA arrangements,
intermediate good producers within the final assembly country would then have
an incentive to lobby for restrictive ROOs in order to block competition from
other FTA intermediate good producers. Given that components from other
FTA partners would not qualify to confer origin, sufficiently restrictive ROOs
could force the use of local, as opposed to other-FTA, components. In the case
of third-country components, tariffs would presumably afford adequate

29

For a thorough discussion of different cumulation rules and of the cumulation provisions in a number of
FTA arrangements, see Paul Brenton, Notes on Rules of Origin with Implications for Regional Integration in
Southeast Asia, (paper prepared for Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, April 22-23, 2003).
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protection, 30 but with tariffs eliminated on FTA intermediate goods, restrictive
ROOs could substitute as a form of protection against the use other-FTA
components as well.

Inefficient final good producers would also have similar incentives to
favor restrictive ROOs, although in their case they would lobby for ROOs at the
extreme end of restrictiveness so that very few final goods from FTA partners
could ever qualify for tariff-free access in the first place. I will argue below
that using restrictive ROOs to constrain intra-FTA trade (on intermediate goods
and on final goods) should be seen as inconsistent with WTO rules, namely
GATT Articles XXIV and III(4).

The upshot of this analysis and the discussion to follow is to favor a
formula for harmonized PROOs that would prohibit component cumulation and
hold the restrictiveness of preferential ROOs to the lower middle range. This
would serve to limit some of the trade diverting effects associated with PROOs
themselves, while still preventing trade deflection and ensuring that a genuine
“substantial transformation” occurs in the country of origin before a local good
could benefit from a regional preference.

I turn below to a fuller discussion of the ways in which existing WTO
rules may apply to discipline preferential ROOs. As mentioned, I will argue that
in the case of FTA agreements these rules should be seen to prohibit both
component cumulation and excessively restrictive ROOs. In the case of GSP
systems, I believe WTO rules have less significance for ROOs, but they still
should be seen to prohibit bilateral cumulation—to be explained below.
30

One might wonder how drawback rules would affect this scenario. Normally tariff drawbacks are not allowed
on trade benefiting from a regional preference. Thus, if Mexico imposes a tariff on tomato paste from Chile, that
tariff could not be drawn back on the export to the United States of Mexican catsup made from Chilean tomato
paste. Hence a sufficiently high Mexican tariff on Chilean tomato paste would still encourage Mexican catsup
makers to use Mexican tomato paste for catsup destined for the U.S. market.
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THE POTENTIAL OF WTO RULES TO DISCIPLINE PROOs

WTO provisions, namely in Articles XXIV and III and in the Enabling
Clause, especially as interpreted in Appellate Body (AB) rulings, have important
implications for the content of preferential ROOs.31 Although one can never
rule out a WTO complaint attacking ROOs provisions,32 my purpose in the
following discussion is primarily to urge a harmonization approach that avoids
legal difficulties. I turn first to FTA agreements where WTO requirements may
have greatest significance and then to GSP systems.

Free Trade Area Agreements

Discrimination Against Third Countries. As already noted, FTA
preferences are approved under WTO rules if they meet the requirements of
GATT Article XXIV. The key Article XXIV provisions for our purposes are
XXIV(4), XXIV(5) (chapeau), XXIV(5)(b), and XXIV(8)(b). We turn first to
Article XXIV(5)(b), which provides:

“with respect to a free-trade area, * * * the duties and other regulations of
commerce maintained in each of the constituent territories and applicable
at the formation of such free-trade area * * * to the trade of contracting
parties not included in such area or not parties to such agreement shall not
be higher or more restrictive than the corresponding duties and other

31
For a different but not inconsistent analysis of how WTO rules might apply to ROOs regimes, see generally
James Mathis, Regional Trade Agreements in the GATT/WTO: Article XXIV and the Internal Trade Requirement
145-170 (The Hague, 2002) (citing GATT documents raising various legal considerations).
32

There has been one WTO complaint procedure so far, based, however, on non-preferential ROOs. See United
States—Rules of Origin for Textiles and Apparel Products, WT/DS243/R (June 20, 2003) (panel’s rejection of
India’s complaint against the U.S. ROO for textiles was not appealed to the AB).
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regulations of commerce existing in the same constituent territories prior
to the formation of the free-trade area * * *” (Emphasis added)

Thus, Article XXIV(5)(b) contemplates that members of an FTA will each
retain the external tariff and other barriers (which may not be increased) that
prevailed prior to forming the FTA. The need for ROOs derives from this
feature of FTAs—the continued existence in each FTA member state of its own
(non-harmonized) tariff and quota regime applicable to third countries. In a
customs union the external tariff is harmonized. Thus, any product shipped from
one member country to another can be accepted duty-free, because that product
and its components would have faced the same tariff levels and other
restrictions, irrespective of the port of entry. But in an FTA, only products that
have undergone some level of processing in the member country from which
they are shipped will be given duty-free treatment. Otherwise, third countries
will simply transship through the country with the lowest external tariff, and the
FTA will be converted into a de facto customs union with an applicable external
tariff equal to the lowest tariff rate prevailing among the members.

In the second edition of their well-known book on the world trading
system, Trebilcock and Howse proposed that Article XXIV(5) be amended to
require all FTA members to apply the lowest tariff level prevailing among the
members.33 Such a system would in effect do away with FTAs and convert all
such agreements—or at least all such future agreements, assuming that existing
agreements would be grandfathered—into customs unions. Indeed, it is hard to
see why countries would ever agree to an FTA on the Trebilcock and Howse
terms, instead of negotiating an overt customs union involving the
harmonization of external tariff levels (with some going up and some coming
down)—unless the members had almost identical tariff schedules to begin with.
33

Michael Trebilcock & Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade at 520 (2d ed. 1999)
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Converting FTAs into customs unions could be a promising way to
eliminate the need for ROOs and the complexities and transactions costs that go
with them. If the political will existed, WTO members might consider a
variation of the Trebilcock and Howse proposal. This variation would consist of
requiring a mini-customs union to operate for all goods on which existing tariff
levels among the FTA members (for the stated good and most of its
components) did not exceed an agreed level of variance. For such goods ROOs
would not be needed. Moreover, FTA members might be required to negotiate
over time the inclusion of an ever larger percentage of FTA trade within the
mini-customs union regime. Of course customs unions also involve trade
diversion in both final and intermediate goods, though they do away with
restrictive ROOs aimed significantly (if not exclusively) at trade diversion in
intermediate goods. One writer has even urged that Article XXIV be amended
to prohibit FTAs and allow only customs unions.34

Another method for eliminating the need for ROOs might be called a
“Value-Added FTA” scheme.35 Since the risk of trade deflection is the central
(if not only) justification for PROOs, trade deflection might be avoided by an
equalizing tariff imposed at all internal FTA borders. The equalizing tariff
would represent the difference in external tariff rate (as between the exporting
and importing FTA members) that would apply on all third-country
components—as long as the importing FTA member’s rate were higher. Such a
scheme could be interpreted to meet the requirements of Article XXIV(8)(b)
(“duties * * * are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the
34

F. A. Haight, “Customs Unions and Free-Trade Areas under GATT,” 6 Journal of World Trade 391, 401
(1972).
35

For a discussion of essentially the same proposal, see James Mathis, Regional Trade Agreements in the
GATT/WTO: Article XXIV and the Internatl Trade Requirement at 169 (The Hague, 2002).
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constituent territories in products originating in such territories”) if “products
originating in such territories” were interpreted to mean “products, or
components (including value added) originating in such territories.” Thus, nonoriginating components could be subjected to an equalizing tariff.36

Even without such radical proposals, however, existing WTO rules,
especially as interpreted by the AB, have the potential to discipline the trade
diverting capability of ROOs in FTAs. The AB’s Turkish Textiles 37decision is
central to this analysis.

Turkish Textiles and Article XXIV. In Turkish Textiles the AB read the
chapeau of Article XXIV(5), in the light of XXIV(4), to impose constraints on
the formation of a regional arrangement. The relevant provisions are as follows:

Article XXIV(4)

“[T]he purpose of a customs union or of a free trade area should be to
facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers
to the trade of other contracting parties with such territories.” (Emphasis
added)

36

Apart from the administrative demands of such a scheme, it would also be less generous to intra-regional
trade than a system based on liberal ROOs without cumulation. In the latter scheme some extra-regional
components in a final product would move tariff free between FTA members, as long as the product undergoes a
“substantial transformation” in the exporting FTA member.
37

Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WT/DS34/AB/R (1999).

24

Article XXIV(5) (chapeau)

“Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as
between the territories of contracting parties, the formation of a customs
union or of a free trade area * * *”

Relying on this language, the AB ruled that in forming a customs union
with the EC, Turkey was not allowed to impose a new quota on Indian textiles to
conform to the existing EC quota under the WTO Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing. The AB found that such a Turkish quota would raise a new barrier
against a third party (India) on textile imports into Turkey and that this new
barrier was not necessary to the formation of the customs union. Hence it
clashed with the paragraph 4 requirement that a customs union or FTA must be
for the purpose of facilitating trade within the regime and not for the purpose of
raising barriers against third countries. Acknowledging that the EC would not
be willing to tolerate trade deflection of third-country textiles into the EC
through Turkey, the AB concluded that Turkey could just as well employ a
ROOs regime to prevent circumvention of the EC quota. In effect, the AB
required Turkey to use this least restrictive means to achieve the legitimate end
of a customs union with the EC.

The core concept in Turkish Textiles seems directly applicable to
restrictive ROOs cum component cumulation in FTAs. As discussed above, it is
actually the regional-component cumulation rule in an FTA agreement that
encourages trade diversion in intermediate products, thereby raising barriers
against third-country intermediate good exports to the region. Restrictiveness in
ROOs of course accentuates this effect. Prior to the FTA, regional producers
would have imported the least cost components, after taking account of
applicable tariffs. However, after the formation of the FT--given regional25

component cumulation--they would in some cases substitute more expensive
regional inputs in order to qualify for the preference. The more restrictive the
ROOs the more often they would do so. Thus the component-cumulation rule
applied on the formation of an FTA will operate to raise barriers (non-tariff
barriers) against intermediate product imports from outside the region.38

If the purpose of an FTA agreement should be to increase trade among the
FTA members, while not “raising barriers to the trade of other contracting
parties,” as stated in XXIV(4), then the component-cumulation rule violates
XXIV(4--at least in any case in which a third country’s input is displaced
because of the component-cumulation rule. An FTA can be created and can
serve its intended purpose of expanding regional trade (through removing
barriers on that trade) without at the same time raising barriers against third
country intermediate products. What is needed is to remove the componentcumulation rule.

In the absence of component cumulation, final good producers would
have no reason to substitute a more expensive partner-FTA input for a less
expensive third-country input in order to satisfy a ROO requirement for “local”
content. Removing component cumulation would also remove a pressure group
(regional intermediate good producers who ship to a final good producer in a
different FTA member) from the political coalition that would otherwise press
for more restrictive ROOs—so that ROOs themselves might consequently be
less restrictive.

38
A discussion paper of the Centre for Economic Policy Research reaches a similar conclusion about the effect
of restrictive ROO but characterizes that effect as the equivalent of an export subsidy to intra-regional exports of
intermediate products. The central point remains that more expensive intermediate products from within the
region will displace cheaper extra-regional intermediate products—the essence of an increased non-tariff barrier
to extra-regional intermediate products. See Olivier Cadot, Antoni Estevadeordal, & Akiko Eisenmann, Rules of
Origin as Export Subsidies (Discussion Paper No. 4999 of the Centre for Economic Policy Research, April
2005) (available online at: www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP4999.asp and at www.ssrn.com/abstract=772070)
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Article XXIV(5)(b), which we discussed above, also supports this
analysis. The important language in this context is as follows:

“[W]ith respect to a free trade area * * * the duties and other regulations
of commerce * * * shall not be higher or more restrictive than the
corresponding duties and other regulations of commerce existing in the
same constituent territories prior to the formation of the free trade area * *
*.” (Emphasis added) 39

Government documents openly acknowledge that preferential ROOs are
instruments of commercial policy.40 Hence it should follow that they constitute
“other regulations of commerce” in the sense of Article XXIV(5)(b). If this is
so, a component-cumulation rule that operates to restrict intermediate product
imports from third countries into an FTA region would run afoul of
XXIV(5)(b)’s prohibition on such increased restrictions--in addition to clashing
with the chapeau of XXIV(5) read in the light of XXIV(4).

Discrimination Against FTA Partners. As mentioned earlier, there are
two respects in which removal of component cumulation would not affect the
self-interest of certain groups to press for excessively restrictive FTA ROOs,
which in turn would lead to trade diversion. For these cases, however, other
WTO provisions come into play.
39
In the case of a customs union the equivalent provision of XXIV(5)(a) says that duties and other regulations
of commerce shall not “on the whole be higher * * *.” This is because for a customs union some external
barriers must be raised while others must be lowered to form a common external commercial policy against third
parties In the case of an FTA, however, there is no justification for any increase in an external barrier against
third country trade.
40

See European Commission, Green Paper: “On the Future of Rules of Origin in Preferential Trade
Arrangements,” at 7 (COM(2003) 787 final; December 18, 2003. (“The preferential rules of origin are an
instrument of commercial policy.” (Emphasis in original). The Green Paper’s approach to preferential ROOs
contrasts sharply with the ROO Agreement’s provisions on non-preferential ROOs. See, e.g., ROO Agreement
Article 2 (b): “[N]otwithstanding the measure or instrument of commercial policy to which they are linked, * *
* [Members shall ensure that non-preferential} rules of origin are not used as instruments to pursue trade
objectives directly or indirectly; * * *”

27

First there is the possibility that under a regime disallowing component
cumulation, local intermediate good producers would have an incentive to seek
restrictive ROOs for protection against more efficient intermediate goods from
FTA partner countries. FTA partner inputs would enter tariff free but could not
be used to satisfy a restrictive ROO. Thus a restrictive ROO (for the final
product) could be used to block imports of cheaper FTA-partner intermediate
goods (in favor of using more expensive local intermediate goods) so that the
final product would qualify as having regional origin. Here, however, Article
III(4) providing for national treatment on regulations affecting the internal sale
of goods would seem to apply. The relevant Article III(4) language is as
follows:

“The products of * * * any contracting party imported into the territory of
any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable
than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws,
regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale * * *” (Emphasis
added)

ROOs going beyond what would be needed to prevent trade deflection—
for eample, ROOs more restrictive than needed to capture “substantial
transformation”—would seem to run afoul of Article III(4)—at least if the
ROOs were so restrictive that they could only be met with the use of local
components (as opposed to other forms of local value added processing).41 In
that situation, partner FTA components would be treated less favorably than
local components. Of course allowing component cumulation would eliminate
41

The AB analyzed a closely analogous issue in Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry,
WT/DS 139 & 142/AB/R (2000). There the question was whether the Canadian scheme of tariff preferences
operated as a prohibited import substitution subsidy under Article 3.1(b) (prohibiting a subsidy contingent on the
use of domestic over imported goods). The AB concluded that a violation could be found if the value-added
requirement of the Canadian scheme were so demanding that it could only be met through the use of domestic
components, as opposed to other aspects of value added, such as local labor costs in processing.
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this difficulty, but would at the same time open up WTO-inconsistent barriers to
inputs from third countries.42 Instead the proper WTO-consistent remedy would
be to remove the unnecessary restrictiveness in the FTA ROOs regime.

Second, removal of component cumulation would not deter regionally
less efficient final good producers from pressing for the most restrictive ROOs
possible.43 As we have seen, such ROOs would limit the number of products
(in this case final goods) that could practically comply and would hence reduce
the number of regional final goods entering a competitor’s market at
preferentially reduced duty rates. However, this protectionist effect would tend
to clash with the Article XXIV(8)(b) requirement that an FTA should eliminate
restrictions on substantially all trade. Highly restrictive ROOs that constrain or
completely block the availability of preferential access of a final good would
thus in effect reduce the amount of trade benefiting from duty-free access. The
more this effect occurs under an FTA agreement the more questionable it
becomes whether the given FTA agreement complies with the “substantially all
trade” requirement of Article XXIV(8)(b).44

Many observers may feel instinctively that some accommodation of
protectionist pressures within an FTA region will be unavoidable. Even so, a
42

We can now see that Article III(4) is also applicable to challenge excessively restrictive ROOs that operate to
favor local intermediate products over third country inputs where, for example, external tariffs would not block
such trade. In this situation it would not be the component cumulation rule that contrained third country
intermediate product imports, but rather the restrictiveness of the ROOs alone.
Moreover, Article III(4) as applicable through the MFN principle in Article I, raises a further argument against
the legality of component cumulation, because component cumulation gives less favorable treatment to thirdcountry intermediate products than to partner FTA intermediate products. This is not an effect coming from free
trade accorded to partner FTA intermediate products, which Article XXIV allows, but rather from the component
cumulation rule in tandem with restrictive ROOs. This violation of the Article I MFN principle (incorporating
Article III(4)) would not seem to be excused in the light of the Turkish Textiles interpretation of Article XXIV
(4) and (5), because it would not be necessary to the formation of the FTA.
43

Intermediate good producers, on the other hand, would prefer ROOs sufficiently restrictive to eliminate
competitors, but not so restrictive as to prevent the final product from gaining preferential access.
44

Of course this same Article XXIV(8)(b) argument also would apply to the use of restrictive ROOs short of the
prohibitive level for the purpose of protecting local intermediate good producers from more efficient
intermediate good producers in other FTA countries.
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special safeguard regime applicable within an FTA agreement would seem
preferable to restrictive ROOs. 45 Temporary safeguards could be employed
where the influx of regional trade causes excessive dislocation. Thus the
remedy would be more suited to the real risk, and the FTA regime would be
unburdened by restrictive ROOs.

Harmonized NPROOs as a Model for Harmonizing FTA ROOs. In the
light of the above legal analysis, it would seem that any set of harmonized
ROOs for FTAs should eliminate regional component cumulation and should
favor less restrictive over more restrictive ROOs. A good model for such an
approach would be the set of harmonized NPROOs currently being negotiated in
Geneva under the ROOs Agreement. Those ROOs will not include cumulation
and are generally acknowledged to be more “neutral” and less restrictive than
the PROOs that are generally applied in preferential arrangements. Moreover
harmonizing NPROOs and PROOs around a single set of ROOs would be a
boon to transparency and simplification in the world trading system.

The European Commission has argued against this approach, calling it a
“false good idea.”46 Its reasons for that conclusion, however, seem
unpersuasive. They fall into three categories. First the Commission prefers an
across-the-board value-added approach to PROOs as compared to the
harmonized rules’ change-of-tariff-heading (CTH) approach. This is not a
principled objection to having one uniform set of ROOs. Whichever approach is
preferred, CTH or value-added, it could be preferred for both preferential and
non-preferential ROOs.
45
For an analysis concluding that regional safeguards are consistent with WTO rules, see Joost Pauwelyn, “The
Puzzle of WTO Safeguards and Regional Trade Agreements,” 7 Journal of International Economic Law 109
(2004). For further discussion of this issue see James Mathis, Regional Trade Agreements in the GATT/WTO:
Article XXIV and the Internal Trade Requirement (The Hague, 2002) (Chapter 9 at 171-190 addresses “Regional
Safeguards and Restrictive Measures).
46

European Commission, Working Paper: “Justification of the Choice of a Value Added Method for the
Dertermination of the Origin of Processed Products,” at 6 (TAXUD/1121/05 Rev. 1; April 20, 2005).
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Second, The Commission notes that NPROOs support measures such as
quotas and trade-remedy barriers that restrict market access, whereas PROOs
support improved access to markets. But why should this distinction matter?
For ROOs of both types the central issue is (or should be) to identify when a
good can “legitimately” be said to originate in a particular country—which
generally means that enough processing has occurred there to cause significant
transformation. If more than that is required for PROOs—as compared to
NPROOs—one may legitimately ask “why”. The main reason would seem to be
to encourage trade diversion for intermediate products—which, as we have seen,
clashes with WTO rules.

Third, and most important, the Commission openly acknowledges that a
goal of PROOs is to encourage sourcing (even of a more expensive intermediate
good) within the relevant “cumulation zone.”47 It admits that PROOs are more
restrictive and not as “neutral” as the harmonized NPROOs. It claims that
PROOs cannot be so “neutral” because they form a part of the EU’s “external
policies and negotiations.”48 These published views of the Commission have a
“smoking gun” quality about them. They claim as a goal the very trade
diversionary policies that seem to violate WTO rules.

The Commission should be commended for its openness in discussing
these issues. It seems almost certain that the same perspectives and
considerations come into play in other countries that adopt restrictive PROOs,

47

See European Commission, Working Paper: “Justification of the Choice of a Value Added Method for the
Dertermination of the Origin of Processed Products,” (TAXUD/1121/05 Rev. 1; April 20, 2005). In arguing for
a value-added approach to PRO the Commission asserts: “Value-added method would be an incentive to source
originating materials (even if more expensive than the non originating ones) from the exporting country or from
a country belonging to the same cumulation zone * * *.” Id. at 7.
48

Id. at 6 (“PRO [preferential rules of origin] are clearly not as ‘neutral’ as the NPRO [non-preferential rules of
origin] but an integral part of external policies and negotiations * * *.”)
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even though they are not as forthright as the Commission in revealing their
motives.

In sum, the harmonized system being developed for NPROOs would seem
a good model for PROOs applicable to FTAs. NPROOs have no cumulation
provisions, and they are generally less restrictive. Hence they will minimize
trade diversion in intermediate products and they will not undermine the
“substantially all trade” requirement of Article XXIV(8)(b).

It should be noted that the analysis just presented would not technically
apply to an FTA arrangement limited exclusively to developing countries. Such
an arrangement would be authorized by the Enabling Clause and would not need
to comply with Article XXIV for legitimacy. The Enabling Clause authorizes
an exception to the core MFN requirement for: “Regional or global
arrangements entered into amongst less-developed contracting parties for the
mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs and * * * non-tariff measures, on
products imported from one another.”49 As a practical matter, however, if
industrial countries were willing to agree to harmonize PROOs for FTAs along
the lines just proposed, it would seem unfortunate to sacrifice simplicity,
transparency and coherence by excluding developing country FTAs from that
regime. On the other hand, proponents of special and differential treatment for
developing countries might consider the S&D goal important enough to justify
more restrictive ROOs for developing country FTAs.

49

Decision on Differential and More Favorable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing
Countries, GATT Document L/4903, 28 November 1979, BISD 26S/203, para. 2(c). One might note that the
term here is “less-developed” and not “developing”. The Enabling Clause distinguishes between developing and
least-developed countries, but it appears to use the term “less-developed” as interchangeable with “developing”.
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GSP Systems

In the case of GSP systems it is again the Enabling Clause, and not Article
XXIV, that has implications for the content of PROOs. In this context, trade
diversion in intermediate products does not pose a legal problem—at least not as
long as the favored producers are in other developing countries. The Enabling
Clause authorizes preferences that benefit developing country producers. It
should not matter whether those producers make intermediate or final products,
or whether trade creation or trade diversion is involved.

However, some GSP systems, including those applied by the United
States and the EU, incorporate bilateral cumulation.50 Cumulation is bilateral
when intermediate products imported from the preference-granting country
count as local value added in the beneficiary developing country. It is hard to
square this with the Enabling Clause, especially as interpreted by the AB’s EC-Tariff Preferences decision.51 That decision found that footnote 3 to the
Enabling Clause had binding force in limiting GSP systems. The important
language in the footnote incorporates into the Enabling Clause the conditions
imposed in the 1971 GATT decision authorizing GSP systems for the first time:

“As described in the Decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES of 25
June 1971, relating to the establishment of “generalized, non-reciprocal

50

For a description of some of the bilateral cumulation elements of the ROO regime applicable in the United
States under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), see Raj Bhala, “The Limits of American
Generosity,” 29 Fordham International Law Journal 299, 356-376 (Issue #2, 2006). For a description of
bilateral cumulation in the GSP regime applicable in the EU, see Paulette Vander Schueren & Michal Cieplinski,
“EC Generalized System of Tariff Preferences in the Making: Improved Market Access for Developing
Countries,” 11 International Trade Law & Regulation 118,122-123 (Issue #4, 2005).
51

EC-Tariff Preferences, WT/DS246/AB/R (2004).
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and non-discriminatory preferences beneficial to the developing
countries.”52

Bilateral cumulation would seem to violate this provision in two ways.
First, it is inconsistent with a “non-reciprocal” regime. Bilateral cumulation
favors the use of intermediate products from the preference-granting country and
in that sense is reciprocal. Second, trade diversion in favor of intermediate
products sourced in the preference granting country assists producers in that
country, instead of developing country producers.

It might be argued that bilateral cumulation also assists developing
countries, because it allows them more flexibility in satisfying the origin rule,
which, if it is not satisfied, would deny the preference. However, an alternative
that does not clash with the Enabling Clause exits. A preference granting
country could drop bilateral cumulation and at the same time relax the
restrictiveness of the applicable ROOs so that an equivalent amount of trade
from developing countries would qualify for preferential treatment. One way to
do so would be to liberalize the ROOs in a general way (e.g., reduce the required
local value added percentage). Another would be to adopt or expand “tolerance
rules” under which a certain amount of non-originating materials would be
treated as local, no matter where they actually originated. This would increase
the flow of goods able to take advantage of the preference, without privileging
grantor-country intermediate products.

52

Decision on Differential and More Favorable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing
Countries, GATT Document L/4903, 28 November 1979, BISD 26S/203, para. 2(a) fn 3.
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CURRENT EFFORTS AT HARMONIZING PROOs (THE INITIATIVE
WITHIN THE EU)

As noted earlier, efforts to launch a harmonization initiative for PROOs at
the WTO level have so far failed. Within the EU, however, considerable
attention is being devoted to the benefits of harmonizing the EU’s own
PROOs.53

The EU’s current approach to preferential ROOs is dramatically nonuniform. The EU has about 40 different preferential arrangements in place
(GSP and FTA systems)54 and almost as many different sets of ROOs, generally
called the “list rules”. The list rules apply product by product or by category of
product. Currently there are 545 different list rules, corresponding to 509
different categories of product, and an additional 107 alternative rules.55
Although the current list rules vary with each particular preferential regime,
their general “architectural” structure follows fairly closely that of the
harmonized NPROOs currently under negotiation in Geneva. That is to say, the
rules use a combination of CTH, Value Added (VA), and Specific Processing
(SP) requirements.56
53

For a summary of the existing EU GSP regime and the proposed new regime, see Paulette vander Schueren
and Michal Cieplinski, “EC Generalized System of Tariff Preferences in the Making: Improved Market Access
for Developing Countries,” 11 International Trade Law & Regulation 118 (Sweet & Maxwell, 2005).
There seems to be nothing comparable to the EU harmonization effort in the United States or other countries.
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substantial transformation test plus generally a 35% value-added requirement. See generally, David Palmeter,
“Rules of Origin in the United States” in Ewin Vermulst, Paul Waer, & Jacques Bourgeois, Rules of Origin in
International Trade—A Comparative Study at 58-84 (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1994). The ROOs for
NAFTA, however, are dramatically different, involving a basic CTH approach supplemented by VA and SP
requirements. Id. (describing the ROOs for the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Area, which are broadly similar, though
not identical, to those applied in NAFTA.)
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European Commission, “Customs: Strategy for Simplified Rules of Origin – Frequently Asked Questions
(MEMO/05/95; 17 March, 2005) at p. 1.
55

European Commission, Working Paper: “Justification of the Choice of a Value Added Method for the
Dertermination of the Origin of Processed Products,” (TAXUD/1121/05 Rev. 1; April 20, 2005) p. 3.
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The European Commission is urging the EU to adopt a single harmonized
set of ROOs for all its preferential arrangements, GSP systems and FTAs alike.57
This effort has focused mainly on the development schemes--seeking
simplification and liberalization--because the EU is preparing a new GSP regime
for the period 2006-2015 and is opening negotiations on new regional Economic
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP)
countries.58 The harmonized ROOs are also intended for FTA agreements,59
presumably for future such agreements or where existing agreements can be renegotiated.

The Commission favors an across the board value added system. Origin
would be conferred if local (or cumulated regional) value added exceeds a
certain stated percentage of net production cost (NPC). NPC would include the
cost of components and production costs directly attributable to output (such as
labor, energy, plant and equipment) but would exclude overhead and related
costs not directly attributable to production (such as marketing, administrative
costs, and profit mark-up).60 The Commission claims that the instability
introduced by exchange rate and price changes can be dealt with through an
averaging system and that administrative costs should not be excessive because
producers regularly keep track of production costs for many purposes, including
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See European Commission, Green Paper: “On the Future of Rules of Origin in Preferential Trade
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Dertermination of the Origin of Processed Products,” (TAXUD/1121/05 Rev. 1; April 20, 2005).
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Future,” (COM(2005) 100 final; March 16, 2005) at p. 6.
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Dertermination of the Origin of Processed Products,” (TAXUD/1121/05 Rev. 1; April 20, 2005) p. 4.
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See Eckart Naumann, Rules of Origin under EPAs: Key Issues and New Directions (paper for Tralac
Conference, October 2005) p. 18 (available at http://www.tralac.org/pdf/20051018_ROO_paper.pdf).
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pricing.61 There are of course other disadvantages to a VA system, such as the
lack of an incentive to keep local production costs down and the bias against
countries with low labor costs. However, other systems also have their
drawbacks.

A major disadvantage of this initiative, however, is that it clashes with the
multilateral NPROOs system being negotiated in Geneva under the ROOs
Agreement. As discussed in the opening section of this essay, the multilateral
NPROOs system under negotiation will rely primarily on a CTH approach,
supplemented on certain tariff lines by value-added and special-processing rules.
If PROOs and NPROOs go their separate ways, overall harmonization in the
future will be made more difficult. Although the Commission considers joining
the two major types of ROOs to be a “false good idea,”62 the analysis presented
above disagrees with that conclusion.

CONCLUSION

This essay has argued for the importance of launching an effort at the
WTO level to harmonize PROOs. Such an undertaking is not likely to be taken
seriously, however, until after the WTO members successfully negotiate a
harmonized set of NPROOs, which at this writing is long overdue. I have
argued further that harmonized NPROOs—which are expected to be relatively
non-restrictive and neutral, based on the concept of “last substantial
transformation”—would provide a good model for a harmonized set of PROOs.
In particular I have claimed that existing WTO rules, namely Article XXIV (4)
(5) and (8)(b) and Article III(4), are most consistent with a set of PROOs that
61
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are non-restrictive and that do not allow component cumulation (or in the case
of GSP systems, bilateral cumulation). A major aim of such an approach to
PROOs is to constrain the tendency of ROOs in FTA agreements to further trade
diversion in intermediate products.

Even if the most ambitious harmonization project were completely
successful, however, distortive trade diversion in final and intermediate products
would still inhere in preferential trading arrangements. Thus, it bears repeating-along with the Future of the WTO report and other commentators--that the most
effective means of dealing with the complexities and distortions introduced into
the global trade order by the burgeoning number of preferential arrangements
and their accompanying ROOs is to move as aggressively as possible to lower
MFN tariffs worldwide. As these come down, so will the distortions associated
with preferences. On the pragmatic assumption, however, that such a first-best
world will be long in coming, it still seems important to pursue harmonization of
PROOs.

38

Bibliography
K. Adamantopoulos & D. de Notaris, “The Future of the WTO and the Reform of the AntiDumping Agreement: A Legal Perspective,” 24 Fordham Int’l L.J. 30 (2000) [AD anticircumvention]
Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 2006 at 276 (on line at
http://www.adb.org/Documents/books/ado/2006/documents/ado2006-part3.pdf.)

Raj Bhala, “The Limits of American Generosity,” 29 Fordham International Law Journal
299, 356-376 (2006).
Robert Baldwin, The Inefficacy of Trade Policy 20 (Princeton Essays in Int’l Finance, 1982
Paul Brenton, Notes on Rules of Origin with Implications for Regional Integration in
Southeast Asia, (paper prepared for Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, April 22-23,
2003).
Paul Brenton & Hiroshi Imagawa, “Rules of Origin, Trade, and Customs” in Customs
Modernization Handbook (
).
Olivier Cadot, Antoni Estevadeordal, & Akiko Eisenmann, Rules of Origin as Export
Subsidies (Discussion Paper No. 4999 orf the Centre for Economic Policy Research, April
2005) (available online at: www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP4999.asp and at
www.ssrn.com/abstract=772070)
Frederic Cantin & Andreas Lowenfeld, “Rules of Origin, The Canada-U.S. FTA, and the
Honda Case,” 87 Amer. J. Int’l L. 375 (1993)
F. Dehousse, K.Ghemar & P. Vicent, “The EU-US Dispute Concerning the New American
Rules of Origin for Textile Products,” 36 J. World Trade 67 (2002)
European Commission, Green Paper: “On the Future of Rules of Origin in Preferential Trade
Arrangements,” (COM(2003) 787 final; December 18, 2003
European Commission, “The Rules of Origin in Preferential Trade Arrangements –
Orientations for the Future,” (COM(2005) 100 final; March 16, 2005)
European Commission, Working Paper: “Justification of the Choice of a Value Added
Method for the Dertermination of the Origin of Processed Products,” (TAXUD/1121/05 Rev.
1; April 20, 2005)
Ian Forrester, “The End of Innocence” in Vermulst et al eds. at 395.

39

F. A. Haight, “Customs Unions and Free-Trade Areas under GATT,” 6 Journal of World
Trade 391 (1972).
Bernard Hoekman, “Rules of Origin for Goods and Services” 27 Journal World Trade Law
Issue 4 p 81 (1993).
Gary Horlick & Patrick Messerlin, “Need for Coherence Among the WTO’s Escape
Clauses”in J. Barceló & H. Corbet, Rethinking the World Trading System ___ (Lexington
Books 2007) (forthcoming).
Robert Hudec, Developing Countries in the GATT Legal System (Gower, 1987)
Robert Hudec, Comment on Michael Finger, “Gatt’s Influence on Regional Arrangements,”
in Jamie De Melo and Arwind Panagariya (eds.), New Dimensions in Regional Integration
155 (Center for Economic Policy Research, Cambridge University Press. 1993).
David Leebron, “An Overview of the Uruguay Round Results,” 34 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 11
(1995) [anti-circumvention not agreed in UR; he says this at p. 20]
James Mathis, Regional Trade Agreements in the GATT/WTO: Article XXIV and the Internal
Trade Requirement (The Hague, 2002)
G. Horlick & M. Meyer, “Rules of Origin from a Policy Perspective” in Vermulst et al eds. at
403.
Eckart Naumann, Rules of Origin under EPAs: Key Issues and New Directions (paper for
Tralac Conference, October 2005) (available at
http://www.tralac.org/pdf/20051018_ROO_paper.pdf).
Lucia Ostoni, “Anti-Dumping Circumvention in the EU and the US: Is There a Future for
Multilateral Provisions under the WTO?” 10 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 407 (2005).
David Palmeter, The WTO as a Legal System—Essays on International Trade Law and Policy
(Cameron May, London, 2003)
David Palmeter, “Rules of Origin in Regional Trade Agreements,” in Paul Demaret, JeanFrancois Bellis, & Gonzalo Garcia Jimenez, Regionalism and Multilateralism aftter the
Uruguay Round at 343-344 (European Interuniversity Press, Brussels, 1997).
David Palmeter, “Rules of Origin in the United States” in Ewin Vermulst, Paul Waer, &
Jacques Bourgeois, Rules of Origin in International Trade—A Comparative Study
(University of Michigan, Ann Arbor,1994).
David Palmeter, “Country of Origin Rules,” 128 F.R.D. 492 (1990).
Joost Pauwelyn, “The Puzzle of WTO Safeguards and Regional Trade Agreements” 7 J. Int’l
Econ. L. 109 (2004).
Frieder Roessler, “The Relationship Between Regional Integration Agreements and the
Multilateral Trade Order,” in K. Anderson and R. Blackhurst (eds.), Regional Integration and
the Global Trading System at 314 (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993).
40

Paulette Vander Schueren & Michal Cieplinski, “EC Generalized System of Tariff
Preferences in the Making: Improved Market Access for Developing Countries,” 11
International Trade Law & Regulation 118,122-123 (Issue #4, 2005).
Peter Sutherland, Jagdish Bhagwati, Kwesi Botchwey, Niall Fitzgerald, Koichi Hamada, John
H. Jackson, Celso Lafer, & Thierry de Montbrial, The Future of the WTO (WTO, Switzerland,
2004).
Michael Trebilcock & Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade (2d ed. 1999)
Michael Trebilcock & Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade (3d ed. 2005)
Edwin Vermulst, “Rules of Origin As Commercial Policy Instruments?—Revisited” in Edwin
Vermulst, Paul Waer, & Jacques Bourgeois, eds., Rules of Origin in International Trade – A
Comparative Study 433 (1994).
E. Vermulst, P. Waer, & J. Bourgeois, eds,, Rules of Origin in International Trade – A
Comparative Study (1994).

41

